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Trade unionists and the Labour Party in 










The trade union-Labour Party link has been termed ‘The Contentious Alliance’ 
by the author Lewis Minkin.1 It was contentious with the pre-1914 socialists and the 
post-1994 New Labour Blairites as well as with Labour’s political opponents, the 
Conservative and Liberal parties. Yet, for the Labour Pa ty the trade unions 
provided a solid bedrock of support and an ideological solidity in hard times, as in 
the face of National Labour in the 1930s and the break-away of the Social Democrat 
Party (SDP) in the 1980s. The trade unions were a reality that the British socialists 
could not ignore. British trade unionism was the oldest in Europe, stretching back 
through the eighteenth century to very early printers’ societies in the late 
seventeenth century. By the late nineteenth century trade unionism was strong 
among skilled workers, was established in some counties with mining and, with the 
‘New Unionism’ of 1888-90, trade unionism flourished among the unskilled (before 
weakening substantially by the mid-1890s). In contrast with Germany where the 
SPD was huge before trade unionism expanded rapidly in the later 1890s, in Britain 
the socialists were small in number and fragmented, dwarfed by the trade unions 
[see Table 1]. The Marxist Social Democrat Federation (SDF) is credited with some 
689 paid-up members in 1886-7, but it seems to have had more than that, albeit ones 
who were unable or failed to pay. The breakaway Socialist League, with William 
Morris (1834-96) as its charismatic leader, was smaller still. Before 1897 the SDF 
leadership which drew on Robert Owen (1771-1858) and the more socialist of the 
Chartist leaders as well as on Marx, was very critical of trade unionism which was 
deemed to be ‘a recognition of capitalism and the right to exploit’, though there 
were strong advocates of trade unionism within the SDF. Morris was also for long 
highly critical of trade unionism but he campaigned in the mining areas of the North 




                                               
1 Lewis MINKIN, The Contentious Alliance: Trade Unions and the Labour Party, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991. 
2  Martin CRICK, The History of the Social Democratic Federation, Keele: Ryburn 
Publishing, Keele University Press, 1994, pp. 68 and 77. E.P. THOMPSON, William Morris: 
From Romantic To Revolutionary, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955, pp. 517-24. 
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Table 1 
 
(a) Trade Union Membership: UK and Germany 1896-1929 
 
 UK membership 
(000s) 
Density (%) Germany membership 
(000s) 
Density (%) 
1896 1,608 10.5 409.1 3.0 
1913 4,135 23.1 3,023.1 16.4 
1920 8,348 45.2 9,192.9 45.2 
1929 4,858 25.7 5,748.1 26.3 
Notes: The German figures exclude the salaried employee associ tions. Density is the 
proportion of members out of those legally eligible to be members. 
 
(b) Labour Party and SPD Membership 
 
 Labour (% Socialist Societies) SPD 
1907 1,072,413 (2.08) 530,000 
1914 1,612,147 (2.06) 1,085,905 
1920 4,359,807 (1.03) 1,180,000 
1929 2,330,847 (1.14) * 
* 1928 was 867,000 and 1930 1,021,000 
 
Sources: G.S. Bain and R. Price, Profiles Of Union Growth (Oxford, Blackwell, 1980), pp.37 
and 133. Henry Pelling and Alastair J. Reid, A Short History of the Labour Party, 11th edition 
(London, Macmillan, 1996), p.197. W.L. Guttman, The German Social Democratic Party 
1875-1933 (London, Allen and Unwin, 1981), p.153. 
 
The Independent Labour Party (ILP), founded in Bradford in 1893 and the 
largest of the late nineteenth century socialist bodies (with 10,720 paid-up members 
in 1894-5), was much closer to trade unionism than the SDF.3 Nevertheless, a few of 
its leading figures, most notably Philip Snowden (1894-1937), who was to be 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in the first two Labour governments (1924 and 1929-
31), were famously often hostile to the trade unions. James Ramsay MacDonald 
(1866-1937), chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party (in effect leader) 1911-14, 
Leader of the Labour Party 1922-31 and Labour Prime Minister (1924 and 1929-31) 
was also far from enthusiastic about trade unionism. This was in contrast to other 
major early Labour Party figures who were (or had been) trade unionists, such as 
James Keir Hardie (1856-1915), David Shackleton (1863-1938) and Arthur 
Henderson (1863-1935).4 
 
In the second half of the nineteenth century most British trade union leaders 
were Liberal Party supporters while most trade unionists vo ed Liberal, but in 
                                               
3  David HOWELL, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party 1888-1906, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983, p. 328. 
4 Keith LAYBOURN, Philip Snowden, Aldershot: Temple Smith, 1988, pp. 52-3. David 
MARQUAND, Ramsay MacDonald, London: Jonathan Cape, 1977. Kenneth O. MORGAN, 
Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975. Ross MARTIN, 
The Lancashire Giant: David Shackleton, Labour Leader and Civil Servant, Liverpool: 
University of Liverpool Press, 2000. Chris WRIGLEY, Arthur Henderson, Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press, 1990. 
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Lancashire, Birmingham and elsewhere many voted Conservative. In the mid to late 
1880s a younger generation of trade union leaders – such as James Keir Hardie and 
Robert Smillie (1857-1940), both Scottish coal-miners, Tom Mann (1856-1941), and 
John Burns (1858-1943), both engineers, and Ben Tillett (1860-1946), a general 
labourer – were socialists and were involved in organising the unskilled workers in 
such sectors as gasworks, docks and shipping as well as in rebuilding coal mining 
trade unionism, which had crumbled in some parts of Britain. Both the older skilled 
trade unions and the large, enthusiastic new unions provided the mass support for 
the huge May Day demonstrations of the early 1890s, with 250-300,00  turning out 
in London alone in 1890-93.5 
 
British trade unionism, which had been more akin to the less party-political 
trade unionism of the USA than the political trade unionism of continental Europe, 
moved decisively towards independent labour representation in Parliament at the 
end of the 1890s in the face of employers’ offensives against trade unionism and a 
series of legal decisions, culminating in the Taff Vale judgement 1902, which 
undercut what the unions believed to be their rights, as estblished in the trade union 
legislation in 1871-75. In 1899 the Trades Union Congress (TUC, established in 
1868 as an annual conference of trade unions but with an executive which could take 
action in line with the conference’s decisions) voted ‘to invite the co-operation of all 
Co-operative, Socialistic, Trade Unions and other working class organisations’ in 
holding a conference ‘to devise ways and means for securing the return of an 
increased number of Labour members to the next Parliament’. 
 
The Labour Representation Committee (LRC), formed in 1900, following the 
TUC’s 1899 resolution, went wider than trade unions affiliated to the TUC. The 
inaugural conference held in Faringdon Street, London, on 27 and 28 February 
1900, was attended by representatives of 66 trade unions, the Midland Counties 
Trades Federation, and three socialist societies (the ILP, the SDF and the Fabian 
Society, which had been founded in 1884 and for 1899 gave its membership as 861). 
The SDF affiliated but withdrew after one year, the co-operative movement, which 
in most areas remained Liberal until the First World War, did not affiliate en masse 
but some co-operative societies did between 1906 and 1917 and from 1927, but 
many trade unions and the ILP and Fabian Society joined and stayed.6 More than 
that, the Taff Vale Judgement of 1901, which awarded huge damages and legal costs 
against the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS) and thereby set a 
legal precedent which undercut unions’ abilities to conduct strikes, encouraged most 
major trade unions to affiliate to the LRC to secure legislation to undo this legal 
verdict. By 1904 all the major unions had affiliated to the TUC except most of the 
coal miners, who did so in 1909. 
                                               
5 Chris WRIGLEY, ‘Great Britain’ in Andrea Panaccione, The Memory of May, Venice: 
Marsitio Editori, 1989, pp. 83-108, and ‘The Memory of May’ in History Today, June 1990, 
pp. 35-41. Gita DENECKERE, Marie-Louise GOERGEN, Inge MARSSOLEK, Danielle 
TARTAKOWSKY, ‘Premiers mai’ in Jean-Louise Robert, Friedhelm Boll and Antoine Prost 
(eds), Les Invention Des Syndicalisme, Paris : Sorbonne, 1997, pp. 199-217.  
6 B.C. ROBERTS, The Trade Union Congress: 1868-1921, London: Allen and Unwin, 1958. 
Chris WRIGLEY, ‘The TUC 1868-1968’, in TUC, Working For Your Future: The TUC 
1868-1993, London: TUC, 1993, pp. 7-29. 
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The LRC won two seats in the 1900 general election and three fu ther seats in 
by-elections. In the 1906 general election 29 of its 50 candid tes were elected, with 
the numbers of successful candidates going up in the January 1910 (40 of 78) and 
the December 1910 (40 of 56) after the mining unions had affiliated. The MPs 
elected in the general elections of 1906, January 1910 and Decemb r 1910 were 
overwhelmingly working class, with 23 of all 29 of 1906 being working class and 23 
of these being manual worker trade unionists.7 
 
Yet, the impact of the ILP was disproportionate in the pre-1914 Parliamentary 
Labour Party to its membership, which ran at around 2 per cent of the trade union 
affiliates to the Labour Party (see Table 1B). Although seven of the 29 MPs were 
ILP sponsored, many more were also ILP members as well as trade unionists. This 
was notably so in the case of J.R. Clynes (1869-1949), who was to be Food 
Controller in 1918 in David Lloyd George’s wartime coalition government. In the 
final vote for the first chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party Keir Hardie beat 
David Shackleton by one vote. The post rotated and after Hardie, 1906-8, the next 
two chairmen were trade unionists, Arthur Henderson, 1909-10 and George Barnes 
(1859-1940), 1910-11, before James Ramsay MacDonald, 1911-14. While som
trade unionist MPs were also ILP members, others were anti-socialist. In the case of 
Arthur Henderson, when, as Secretary of the Labour Party (1912-34), he was the UK 
link with the Second International and it was felt to be diplomatic for him to be a 
member of a socialist society, it was notable that in 1912 he joined not the ILP but 
the very moderate Fabian Society. 
 
The early Labour leaders took care to acknowledge their dependence on the 
trade unions. Ramsay MacDonald, when delivering fraternal greetings to the TUC in 
1904 stated: ‘The Labour Representation committee is neither sister nor brother to 
the Congress, but its child’.8 The trade unions very largely funded the Labour Party. 
In the 1906 and two 1910 general elections there were 186 candidates, of whom 137 
were sponsored by trade unions. In 1906 the unions funded 79 per cent and in the 
two 1910 general elections 90 per cent of total expenditure (with the Miners’ 
Federation of Great Britain affiliated from 1909). In 1910 the Miners’ Federation 
paid an average of £1,225 per candidate for its 49 candidates, the other unions paid 
an average of £696 per candidate for their 54 candidates and the socialist societies 
paid an average of £467 for each of their 31 candidates. The total p litical 
expenditure of the trade unions, including local as well as national elections, during 
1906 to 1910, was in excess of £150,000.9 
 
That such large amounts of trade union money were going to Lab ur Party 
candidates outraged some trade unionists who supported either the Liberals or the 
Conservatives. Walter Osborne, a railwayman who had once been a member of the 
SDF, became a campaigner for trade unions which (as he put it in his book Sane 
Trade Unionism) bargained ‘merely for the rightful division of the profits as between 
                                               
7 L. MINKIN , Contentious Alliance, p. 13. 
8 H.A. CLEGG, A. FOX and A.F. THOMPSON, A History of British Trade Unions Since 
1889, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 380. 
9  Michael PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, British Political Finance 1830-1980, Washington: 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981, pp. 62-4. 
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the two partners – capital and labour’. He took the view that ‘there can be no 
liberty apart from private property. Property and the means of existence in many 
hands guarantee independenc  and freedom’. His attempts to set up a Trade Union 
Political Freedom League and a socialist-free British Labour Party did not get far.10 
 
However, Osborne succeeded in gaining a verdict at the Court of Appeal, and 
upheld by the Law Lords, against his union the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants (ASRS) over its levying money for political purposes. He had failed in the 
lower court, as had a group of Conservative South Wales miners in 1907, who 
objected to union funds supporting Liberal candidates. The Osborne Judgement, 
1909, rendered many trade union activities illegal, including fiancing newspapers, 
and it even made support for trades councils and the TUC questionable. However, 
trade unions set up voluntary funds (which accumulated far smller sums) and the 
unions pressed for changes in the law. This came with the Trade Union Act 1913, 
which required trade unions to hold ballots to establish political funds and made 
provision for members to contract out of paying the political levy.11 While some 
trade unions had large minority votes against establishing a political levy – with the 
minority against being 88.0 per cent of the Yes vote in the Association of Carpenters 
and Joiners, 77.3 per cent in the Amalgamated Weavers Association and 74.5 per 
cent of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain – all the large unions did vote in 
favour, with the total vote of unions registered with the Chief Registrar of Friendly 
Societies breaking down to 70.4 per cent in favour and 29.6 per cent against.12 
 
A feature of the period 1905-14 was the way that the older political parties 
sought to gain trade unionist political support and manoeuvred to block others 
benefiting from trade union funds. The Conservative Party throughout the twentieth 
century repeatedly sought to create a credible Conservative trade union body. In the 
period after the 1906 general election, when the Conservatives lost many seats in 
working class areas of Lancashire, they made particular efforts to organise 
sympathetic workers. The Labour MP J.R. Clynes, who represented a Manchester 
seat, commented in the House of Commons in 1912: ‘Conservative agents are 
known to be endeavouring to organise and establish r val trade unions – 
constitutional trade unions, non-political trade unions – and all you have to do to be 
a non-political trade unionist is to be a Tory, and generally to associate yourself 
with the party of that name’. Andrew Bonar Law (1858-1923), soon to be the 
Conservative Party leader, wrote in October 1910 that he wanted the Osborne 
Judgement upheld but favoured the payment of Members of Parliament. For he 
believed ‘that the members of Trade Unions would not see the fun of subscribing for 
political purposes, and that therefore the political influence of the Trade Unions 
would be destroyed’.13 
                                               
10  W.V. OSBORNE, Sane Trade Unionism, London: Collins, 1913. Chris WRIGLEY, 
‘Labour and the Trade Unions’ in K.D. Brown (ed.), The First Labour Party 1906-1914, 
London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 129-57. 
11 W.B. GWYN, Democracy and the Cost of Politics, London: Athlone Press, 1962, pp. 178-
205. 
12 Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies for the Year 1912, London: HMSO, 
1914, pp. 91-2. 
13 WRIGLEY, ‘Labour and the Trade Unions’, pp. 138-41.  
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The political influence of the trade unions was enhanced in the industrially 
turbulent pre First World War years and even more so in the war and the postwar 
boom of 1919-20. Table 2 provides details of the considerable rise in trade union 
membership 1911-20. Over half the male labour force was in trade unions in 1919 
and 1920, densities not achieved again until after the Second W rl  War in 1946, 
while the 1920 female density was only surpassed from 1942. Trade union 
membership went up in the war years even though some 5.9 million men went into 
the Armed Forces. Although trade union affiliation fees to the Labour Party were 
lowered, the sheer greater number of trade unionists resulted in the Labour Party 
having bigger resources for fighting postwar elections. Trade union financial 
strength generally was greater not only because of increased income but also as 
there were reductions in some costs (few being unemployed and with strikes illegal, 




UK Trade Union Membership 1910-21 (in thousands) 
 
 Male Female Total 
 Membership Density Membership Density Membership Density 
1910 2287 18.6   278   5.3 2564 14.6 
1911 2804 22.6   335   6.3 3139 17.7 
1912 3026 24.3   390   7.2 3416 19.1 
1913 3702 29.6   433   8.0 4135 23.1 
1914 3708 29.5   437   8.0 4145 23.0 
1915 3868 30.7   491   9.0 4359 24.1 
1916 4018 31.8   626 11.4 4644 25.6 
1917 4621 36.4   878 15.9 5499 30.2 
1918 5324 41.8 1209 21.7 6533 35.7 
1919 6600 51.6 1326 23.7 7926 43.1 
1920 7006 54.5 1342 23.9 8348 45.2 
1921 5628 43.6 1005 17.8 6633 35.8 
  
Source:  Bain and Price, Profiles of Union Growth, p.37 
 
The huge wartime demand for manpower put labour in a strong position in the 
labour market in Britain as in other belligerent nations. The British government 
came to a voluntary agreement to suspend strikes and achieve labour flexibility with 
some major trade unions at the Treasury conference in February 1915. These 
changes became statutory requirements with the Munitions of War Act, 1915. As the 
state took control of more and more of British industry and settled wage rates 
nationally, the TUC and the key trade unions were increasingly consulted by 
government and brought into wartime committees. Similarly, when the first wartime 
coalition government was formed by H.H. Asquith (1852-1928), Arthur Henderson 
entered the Cabinet on behalf of the Labour Party. When Asquith was succeeded as 
Prime Minister by David Lloyd George (1863-1945) in 1916, Henderson becam  a 
member of the small War Cabinet (and on resigning in August 1917, he was 
succeeded by G.N. Barnes, another prominent former trade union leader). So during 
the First World War the trade unions had moved from the margins of government, 
often making their points by presenting petitions, to being consulted at the highest 
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levels of government. The Labour Party had emerged from being dependent on an 
electoral pact with the Liberal Party. 
 
While the British trade unions had been overwhelmingly moderate before the 
First World War, there had been some notably socialist trade unionists, ranging from 
Tom Mann, Ben Tillett, Will Thorne and other leading ‘New Unionists’ to militant 
miners in South Wales. The pressures of the First World War, with severe 
restrictions on labour yet with much profiteering in industry and retailing, led to the 
radicalisation of many workers. In metal working centres such as Sheffield and 
Glasgow, as in Berlin, St Petersburg, Milan and Turin, militant left wing trade 
unionism emerged. 
 
Militant engineering workers provided many of the early leaders of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), with many others coming from 
coalmining or the railways. Tom Mann, who was the best known trade unionist in 
the early period of the CPGB, wrote in a pamphlet praising Soviet Russia: 
 
Let me suppose the reader is an unemployed member of the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union; has exhausted state unemployed 
benefit, is now receiving only a few shillings a week from the union, 
family life rapidly deteriorating… confronted with the employers’ 
present demand that those in work shall be subjected to ‘another 12½ 
per cent reduction in wages. Are you one who still fai s to see the 
necessity for a change of system from Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie 
to Dictatorship of the Proletariat?14 
 
In Britain, however, there was no major split in the trade union movement, 
although the CPGB had some, although limited, success with a minority movement 
in the trade unions and with the National Unemployed Workers’ Movement (which 
gained some support beyond the CPGB). The great majority of British trade 
unionists remained moderate, though after 1918 more were likely to vote Labour 
than Liberal. 
 
The 1918 general election was fought in the euphoria of victory, with Lloyd 
George and his coalition Liberal and Conservative supporters winning a landslide 
victory. Most of the Labour Party leaders lost their seats. Yet the solid bedrock of 
trade union votes in some constituencies ensured 57 MPs were elected, of whom 25 
were miners and 24 sponsored by other trade unions. The financial strength of the 
miners was displayed in Durham, where the miners funded 10 sub agents, 39 polling 
agents and 97 clerks, and in six mining area seats in County Drham, where they 
funded 66 sub agents, 68 polling agents and 65 clerks.15 
 
During and after the First World War the Labour Party widened its appeal 
                                               
14 Tom MANN, Russia In 1921, London: British Bureau, Red International of Labour Unions, 
n.d. [1921]), p. 18. Tom MANN, ‘The Case for the Engineers’ in Philip Snowden and others, 
What We Want And Why, London: Collins, 1922, pp. 90-133. 
15  Duncan TANNER, Political Change and the Labour Party 1900-1918, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1990, p. 465. 
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beyond male trade unionists. Before 1914 the party had supported v t s for women 
and it had promoted several inner city issues, including providing breakfasts at 
schools for needy children and providing better housing, as well as campaigning for 
pensions and on behalf of the unemployed. After the war, Labour continued to speak 
up for equality. In 1919 there was a breakaway trade union from the National Union 
of Teachers, the National Association of Schoolmasters, which represented a revolt 
of male teachers over pressure for equal pay for their female colleagues. Henderson, 
writing in a Labour educational journal in March 1920 was firmly in support of 
equality, writing: ‘The present disparities in the remuneration of men and women 
teachers cannot be defended on the grounds of justice or expediency’.16 During the 
war the Labour Party won much support by taking up issues such as food hortages 
and insufficient allowances for soldiers’ wives and children or widows. Also the 
Labour Party’s constitution, organisation and policies were overhauled in 1917-18 
under the direction of Henderson, with the intention of turning the party into a broad 
based party competing for office. Yet, it was in the later 1920s, as Mike Savage, a 
historical sociologist, has argued, that Labour politics in many areas became based 
on ‘a new network of popularly controlled neighbourhood institutions’, with 
women’s organisations being especially important.17 
 
Nevertheless, the trade unions remained at the centre of Labour politics. 
Representatives of the TUC and the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) 
joined with the Labour Party’s national executive committee in the Joint Board from 
1906 to 1921.18 This had discussed amendments to such measures as the Trades 
Disputes Bill in 1906 and the National Insurance Bill in 1911. Henderson, who 
chaired the Joint Board from 1910, used it to steer the trade unions the way the 
Labour Party wished to go. It was replaced in 1921 with the National Joint Council 
(in 1934 renamed the National Council of Labour), with equal numbers of 
representatives from the newly formed General Council of the TUC, the Labour 
Party’s national executive committee and the Parliamentary Labour Party.19 
 
Labour in office in 1924 and 1929-31 annoyed the trade union leadership 
by insufficiently consulting the National Joint Council on policies. The National 
Joint Council met only twice in 1924 and, as Vic Allen has written, it ‘transacted 
little and relatively unimportant business’. Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister, 
avoided consulting the TUC general secretary. Overall, the trade union leadership 
believed the first Labour government failed to respond to trade union concerns, 
whether over unemployment or industrial grievances. After the fall of the 
government, Ernest Bevin (1881-1951), the powerful general secretary of the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU) wanted MacDonald replaced by 
                                               
16 Arthur HENDERSON, ‘Labour and Education’, The New Highway, 1, 31 March 1920, p. 1. 
17 Mike SAVAGE, The Dynamics of Working Class Politics: The Labour Movement in 
Preston 1880-1940, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 195-8. 
18 G.D.H. COLE, A History of the Labour Party From 1914, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1969, p. 265. 
19 Chris WRIGLEY, Arthur Henderson, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1990, pp. 51, 61 
and 64-5. Ross MCKIBBIN, The Evolution of the Labour Party 1910-1924, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1974, pp. 211-3. 
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Henderson as Leader of the Labour Party.20 
 
MacDonald’s distancing himself from the trade union leadership was part 
of his concern to make the Labour Party a national party, not a party largely 
restricted in its appeal to one class. Such concerns were heightened in the General 
Strike, May 1926, when the TUC backed the coal miners in resisting cuts in wages 
and other working conditions. MacDonald had long argued against general strikes 
and believed the miners’ demands were unrealistic. In his diary on 2 May 1926 he 
commented: ‘The election of this fool [the militant Arthur Cook (1883-1931)] as 
miners’ secretary looks as though it would be the most calamitous thing that hs 
ever happened to the TU movement. The chief criminal, however, is the 
Government’.21 This situation was echoed in the 1984-5 mining strike when t then 
Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock (1942- ), while supporting the miners, made clear 
his lack of enthusiasm for the union president, Arthur Scargill (1938- ). 
 
From the First World War until the General Strike the Labour Party’s 
opponents liked to claim there was a revolutionary threat, with the trade unionists as 
gullible people who could be exploited by the ruthless. Earlier, the young Winston 
Churchill in his only novel, Savrola (1900), had mixed together upper class British 
fears of bomb-throwing anarchists with concern over the ris  in Germany of the 
SPD. After the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 right-wing authors such as 
John Buchan (1875-1940), who wrote some of his novels when Director of the 
Department of Information 1917-8, and ‘Sapper’ (Cyril NcNeile 1888-1937) 
depicted sinister figures manipulating trade unionists, leading them away from 
‘patriotic’ views into socialism. Conservative politicians similarly warned of 
dangerous forces at work behind the moderate trade union figures. Lloyd George, 
the Liberal Prime Minister of a coalition government, observed in 1920 that: 
 
the great danger of a Labour government was that they would allow 
themselves to be rushed and would lose control… If Henderson and his 
friends were in authority and there was a strike, say, in Manchester, 
they would not be prepared to use force to preserve law and order. 
They would send a man down to talk to the crowd. And they would 
share Kerensky’s fate.22 
 
Ramsay MacDonald and the other Labour Party leaders had been happy 
during the first Labour Government of 1924 to demonstrate their responsibleness in 
office. The second Labour Government, 1929-31, was also moderate. The Liberal 
leader, Lloyd George, often felt frustrated at the inability of MacDonald (Prime 
Minister), Philip Snowden (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and their colleagues to 
break away from fiscal orthodoxies and to undertake imaginative remedies to 
growing unemployment. These failings also angered leading trade unionists, most 
notably Ernest Bevin. The Parliamentary Labour Party of 287 had 115 trade union 
                                               
20 Vic ALLEN, Trade Unions And The Government, London: Longmans, 1960, pp. 223-38. 
Alan BULLOCK, The Life And Times Of Ernest Bevin: Trade Union Lead r, 1881-1940, 
London: Heinemann, 1960, pp. 258-9. 
21 David MARQUAND, Ramsay MacDonald, London: Cape, 1977, pp. 435-6. 
22 Lord Riddell’s diary, 10 January 1920. Riddell Papers, British Library, Add. Ms. 62985, f. 7-8. 
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sponsored members. At 40 per cent, this was lower than ever b fore (there being 53 
and 58 per cent of the Labour MPs sponsored by trade unions after the previous 
general elections of 1923 and 1924). MacDonald took no more notice of the trade 
unions than he had in 1924.23 
 
However, the balance of power tilted strongly towards Bevin and the trade 
unions after the departure of Ramsay MacDonald to be Prime Minister of a 
Conservative dominated government in 1931, followed that autumn by a general 
election in which MacDonald and Snowden denounced their former colleagues and 
the number of Labour MPs fell from 289 to 46 (plus five ILP candidates who did not 
seek Labour Party endorsement and one Independent). Bevin and W lter Citrine 
(1887-1983), General Secretary of the TUC 1926-46, resurrected the National Joint 
Council and the trade union leaders had an input into such crucial b t contentious 
issues of the 1930s as defence and foreign policy. Yet, as Lewis Minkin has 
emphasised, the two sides kept to themselves the final say over their distinctive 
political and industrial roles.24 
 
From 1929 Ernest Bevin’s thinking on economic issues became very 
influential in the labour movement. With the economist J.M. Keynes (1883-1946), 
he served on the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry, 1930-1, and argued 
for devaluation of the pound. He also served with Keynes on the Economic 
Advisory Committee set up in 1930 to advise the government. On the TUC’s 
economic committee he accepted the case for tariffs. In 1931-2 he chaired the 
Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, a body which later would have been 
termed a think-tank. With Citrine in 1935-7 he moved the Labour Party away from 
its near pacifist policies to demanding rearmament.25 
 
Table 3: UK Trade Union Membership and the Labour Party’s 
vote in general elections, 1931-9 
 

















1931 3859 29.1 765 12.8 4624 24 6,62,561 
1933 3661 27.4 731 12.0 4392 22.6 - 
1935 4106 30.6 736 12.4 4590 23.5 8,325,491 
1939 5288 38.9 1010 16.0 6298 31.6 - 
 
Source: Bain and Price, Profiles of Union Growth, p. 37. Pelling and Reid, A Short History of 
the Labour Party, p.200. 
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24 MINKIN , The Contentious Alliance, pp. 30-1. 
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Trade union membership, which had fallen since 1921, and Labour Party 
support both began to recover during the 1930s. Table 3 indicates UK trade union 
membership and the votes given to the Labour Party in the 1930s. In the 1935 
general election 79 of the 154 elected Labour candidates were trad  unionists. Of 
these 34 were sponsored by the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain, a much larger 
number than the second largest group, seven, sponsored by the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union.26 
 
Labour returned to office in Winston Churchill’s wartime coalition 
government, 1940-5. Ernest Bevin, the most powerful trade union leader of the 
interwar years, was Minister of Labour and National Servic  and from September 
1940 until the end of the war in Europe a member of Churchill’s small war cabinet. 
Churchill wrote of Bevin that he had ‘the whole man-power of the nation to manage 
and animate. All the workers in the munitions factories were ready to take his 
direction’.27 The trade union movement emerged from the Second World War strong 
and widely respected for its part in the war effort. At the 1947 Conservative Party 
conference Churchill stated: ‘The trade unions are a long-established and essential 
part of our national life… we take our stand by these pillars of our British Society as 
it has gradually developed and evolved itself, of the right of individual labouring 
men to adjust their wages and conditions by collectiv  bargaining, including the 
right to strike…’. At the 1950 Conservative Party conference he urged ‘every Tory 
craftsman or wage earner’ to be an active member of a trade union.28 This was a 
long way from Conservative Party attitudes earlier, or later under Margaret 
Thatcher. 
 
There was greater harmony between the third (and first majority) Labour 
government under Clement Attlee (1883-1967), 1945-51. In the 1945 general 
election 393 Labour candidates were elected, 31 per cent of whom were trade union 
sponsored. Again the largest group was the miners, 35 standing and 35 being 
elected, with the TGWU again second, which had 17 of its 18 candidates elected. 
Three railway unions (NUR, RAC and ASLEF) secured the election of 22 of their 
23 candidates. Of the six trade union sponsored MPs in the cabinet, Ernest Bevin 
was Foreign Secretary, Aneurin Bevan (1897-1960) was Minister of Health and 
George Isaacs (1883-1979), who had been secretary of the National Society of 
Operative Printers and Assistants (NATSOPA), 1909-49, and chairman of the TUC, 
1945, was Minister of Labour. Attlee was more eager than MacDonald that his 
ministers should consult the TUC and individual unions wherever possible. The 
government repealed the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927, hostile 
legislation which had followed the General Strike, 1926, and it also pleased the trade 
union movement with its broad programme of nationalization (but not with the 
amount of trade union participation in management) and the establishment of the 
Welfare State.29 
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The essential feature of the Labour Party–t ade union relationship in 1945-
51 was the support the trade union movement gave what it sawas its government in 
the massive task of reconstruction – both physical and financial – after the Second 
World War. The TUC backed the governments’ voluntary incomes policy from 1948 
until 1950 (when the 1949 devaluation added to other inflationary pressures to make 
severe restraint on wage rises unrealistic). In this period trade union and widespread 
public support made this incomes policy more effective than tose of 1960-74.30 
 
So what went wrong in British politics for the trade unions in the 1950s and 
after? The first issue was that fears of mass unemployent, as in the 1930s, were not 
realised. The prosperity in the international economy from about 1950 to 1973 
avoided this. In Britain the avoidance of high unemployment was also facilitated by 
both Labour and Conservative governments following Keynesia counter-cyclical 
policies, trying to maintain a steady level of aggregate demand in the economy. The 
period 1950 to the early 1960s saw low unemployment and buoyant deman  for 
labour. As a result the trade unions were in a strong position to press wage and other 
demands. In the 1950s inflation, not unemployment, became the worry of the 
Conservative governments of 1951-64 and the trade unions were deemed to be a 
major cause of rising costs in British industry. The issue of rising prices was 
examined in the 1956 government White Paper, The Economic Implications of Full 
Employment (Cmd 9725) which urged ‘self-restraint in making wage claims and 
fixing profit margins’. 
 
Related to concerns of trade union action raising prices wre issues of 
relatively low productivity in British industry compared with other countries and 
strike levels. While British economic growth rates were good in comparison to the 
British past, including the classic Industrial Revolution period, they were poor 
compared to other Western industrialised countries, not least We Germany and 
Japan. Such concerns were not only aired by politicians but in the newspapers, in 
films such as I’m All Right Jack (1959) and on television.31 Alert to the likely 
adverse electoral implications of trade union unpopularity, Harold Wilson (1916-
92), Prime Minister in the fourth Labour government, 1964-70, set up a Royal 
Commission on trade unions and employer organisations (1965-68) chaired by Lord 
Donovan. The Donovan Report supported the largely voluntary, as opposed to 
statutory, system of industrial relations, found that the problem of strikes was the 
high proportion of them being unofficial and found that the British level of strikes 
was at an intermediate level between those countries with a large number of disputes 
such as Italy, Ireland, Canada and the United States and those with relatively few, 
such as France and Japan. Nevertheless, much of the press and right wing politicians 
continued to argue that high levels of strikes were a peculiarly ‘English disease’. 
 
In early 1979 a series of strikes, many in the public sector, undermined 
confidence in the Labour government under James Callaghan (1912-2005), 1976-79. 
In previous industrial unrest, notably between the Conservative government of 
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Edward Heath (1916-2005), 1970-74, and the miners, the Labour Party had an 
advantage in being deemed to be able to work with the unions. The link also at first 
proved valuable in Harold Wilson’s 1974-76 government, when the government and 
the unions made ‘The Social Contract’ whereby the unions supported incomes 
policy (which between 1975 and 1977 played a major part in cutting inflation from 
24 to 8 per cent) and in return the government delivered social benefits (such as 
better pensions) and tax cuts. In the ‘Winter of Discontent’ of early 1979 the trade 
unions and strikes were a major liability for the Labour Pa ty. In his diary on 16 
January 1979, Bernard Donoughue (1934- ), Senior Policy Advisor to James 
Callaghan, noted of the strikes: 
 
This is all creating a strong public reaction – against the unions, and 
against us. So this crisis is the worst for us in the past five years. The 
Tories have never been able to really hurt us. But our strongest card 
has been that we have seemed able best to deal with the unions. Now 
that card looks very weak. 
 
On 19 January he noted Callaghan saying that he had been ‘gravely politically 
damaged’ in the past week.32 
 
It was in this period that Margaret Thatcher dropped her caution on the 
issue of the trade unions and made ‘taming the unions’ a major feature of her 
politics. The Thatcher governments, 1979-90, were marked by a strong belief in the 
effectiveness of free market forces in making a strong economy, and part of this 
belief was a conviction that trade unions damaged the economy and resulted in 
worse levels of unemployment. The Labour-trade union link became a standard part 
of Conservative electioneering in the general elections of 1979, 1983 and 1992, with 
lessening favourable responses from the British electorate. 
 
Conservative criticism of the Labour Party trade union link became less 
effective as the trade unions became weaker in the 1990s. UK trade union 
membership peaked at 13,289,000 in 1979 but by 1995 had dropped to 8,089,000. 
Trade union density fell from 53 per cent in 1979 to under 30 per cent by 1998. It 
also became less effective because public opinion which had been hostile to the 
trade unions in the 1980s became more positive to them when many felt the 
Conservatives had gone too far with hostile trade union legislation in the late 1980s 
and 1993 and with the closure of much of the coal industry. Furthermore, 
Conservative criticisms of the trade unions as a source of Labour Party funds 
became less damaging as the Conservative reliance on hedge funds and other 
finances appeared less admirable with the financial crisis of 2008. 
 
The images of overmighty trade union barons, which had been built up by 
the popular press, have been undermined by the research of Lewis Minkin. While 
the trade unions continued to expect to be consulted by the Labour Party on 
industrial relations and employment issues, generally they did not exert pressure on 
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other policies as a price for their funds. Generally the trade union representatives on 
the Labour Party’s National Executive Committee were forces for moderation and 
gave Labour’s leaders loyal support.33 Nationally and at constituency level the trade 
unions have provided both finance and activists which have been a bedrock of 
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